Trump 2.0 and the Indo-Pacific

The reelection of Donald Trump as U.S. president marks a pivotal inflexion point for global geopolitics, with his administration’s strategic choices poised to reshape alliances, redefine multilateralism, and amplify power struggles in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. 

As Trump’s return galvanizes a U.S. retreat from cooperative frameworks, the world watches to see whether his “America First” doctrine will fracture the Indo-Pacific’s security architecture, embolden rivals, and unravel decades of multilateral consensus—or forge a new, contentious paradigm of great-power competition.

The Indo-Pacific 

The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as a pivotal arena in global geopolitics, where the strategic interests of major powers converge and sometimes clash. From an Asian perspective, the photo optic of convening the first foreign policy event of Trump 2.0, which was the Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting, essentially puts the focus on a fundamental issue regarding the role and impact of the Quad in the Indo-Pacific.

This issue arises from the divergent views held by the United States and Australia, which see the Indo-Pacific as a strategic framework comprising the Pacific Ocean and only half of the Indian Ocean. For these two Quad partners, the Indo-Pacific extends from the western (Pacific) shores of the United States to the tip of the Indian peninsula in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

In contrast, Japan so far has remained steadfast in its broader interpretation of the Indo-Pacific, as articulated by the late Japanese PM Shinzo Abe. He advocated for a holistic approach that integrates the entire Indian and Pacific oceans, bringing West Asia and East Africa into the strategic framework—a perspective that India’s PM Narendra Modi endorsed at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue.

The unfolding of the Trump Administration’s strategy in aligning these differing views will be intriguing to observe. Can the U.S. continue to engage in the Indo-Pacific without factoring in the vital landmass of Asia and the eastern part of the African continent? Can the U.S. solely focus on maritime issues in the Indo-Pacific without integrating developments in the hinterland of the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the Indian Ocean region? The answer to this question could shape the geopolitical dynamics of the region and beyond.

During the Biden Administration, there was a conscious choice by the U.S. to prioritise a military alliance (in which the U.S. dominates in decision-making) versus a partnership structure in the Indo-Pacific. The creation of a military structure called AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) and the bolstering of the U.S.-Japan-Republic of Korea military framework are examples of this priority.

Increased militarisation of international cooperation may give a fillip to calls for creating an “Asian NATO.” Such developments, however, raise questions about the long-term implications for the sustainability of regional security, peace, and development.

The United Nations

Turning to the United Nations, the Trump Administration’s approach will become clearer by mid-2025. With reports of U.S. withdrawals from certain U.N. bodies like the WHO and the Paris Agreement of the UNFCCC, the U.S. will cede space on the ground in leading the policy-making space within these multilateral bodies. Unlike during the first Trump Administration, the response of other UN member-states to such a dilution of U.S. engagement in multilateralism may be more robust, with other major powers seeking to replace the U.S. in its traditional leadership role. 

A sector where this issue will play a role is the digital domain. Major U.S. corporations, led by figures like Elon Musk and lately Jeff Bezos, who have publicly supported the election of President Donald Trump, are well placed to influence multilateral diplomacy through a U.S. leadership role in the emerging digital domain using the accepted U.N. template of “multiple stakeholder” participation. Any major U.S. withdrawal from multilateralism will impact adversely on the interests of such big U.S. technology corporations. 

Meanwhile, China’s growing influence presents another layer of complexity. In October 2024, China agreed to contribute 20% of the U.N. General Budget, just behind the U.S. at 22%. China’s strategic initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative, are poised to fill any voids left by the U.S. in UN structures.

The question remains: how will the U.S. respond to China’s expanding role? Will it opt for cooperation and competition, or lean towards confrontation?

The global community watches closely, as these decisions will have far-reaching consequences for international relations and the future of multilateralism.