Rights of future generations: The emptiness and the plenitude

While there were certainly many precursors, the ‘rights of future generations’ theme entered the international political mainstream with the Brundtland Commission Report.[1] The report spoke of ‘sustainable development’[2] – a complex and ambitious, if ambiguous, concept. The discussion, however, soon ‘hardened’: ‘Most agree that the central idea of the Brundtland Commission’s definition of “sustainable development” is that of intergenerational equity.’ I shall, therefore, address both the (hard) theoretical and the soft or pragmatic approach to ‘intergenerational rights.’

The emptiness of the rights approach

An economist (and, I may add, a philosopher)
is someone who sees something that works in practice
and wonders if it would work in theory.
—Ronald Reagan

The tendency to frame political discussions in terms of ‘rights’ probably goes back to Thomas Hobbes. The Anglo-Saxon world has long viewed political discourse through the contractual lens.[3] Many scholarly articles have addressed intergenerational ‘justice.’ However, issues surrounding the concept remain unresolved when discussing intergenerational equity. Some of these issues include:

• Intergenerational justice ought to reflect an “inheritance” rather than “conflict” approach. While the rhetoric speaks of ‘common heritage,’ the ‘rights’ discourse often points to conflict. It should encompass the entire interface of the transition from the present to the future.[4] After all, the retiring generation leaves everything – good and bad – for the next. For example, while the current generation depletes the environment, how much should one value the technological advances and transformations that enable so many to live in dignity today and tomorrow? Even as we foreclose options, we create new or different ones whose value may currently be invisible. In a dynamic setting, we produce enablers, not outcomes.[5]
• Intergenerational justice must arbitrate between generations, including the current one. The present generation also has rights. However, the current generation is both a party and a judge in these proceedings (since we are discussing non-overlapping generations). Logically, this creates a situation of anomie, where any decision is arbitrary. Moral sentiment (soft law) offers no guidance towards a possible compromise.
• One generation versus many future ones. Any adjudication of rights inevitably favours the latter. From the perspective of the present, this seems particularly unfair. Over the past 200 years, later generations, building on the sacrifices (investments) of previous ones, have consistently become richer. Why, then, should the current generation sacrifice for those expected to be wealthier?
• Intergenerational justice implies a persistence of wants, tastes, and context. This presumption projects current social and material realities into the future. By presuming to know the conditions and demands of future generations, this form of justice acts, at best, paternalistically.
• A rights approach requires consideration of distributive justice. Achieving distributive justice is challenging even today. Planning for future distributive justice is nearly impossible.
• Who is responsible for securing intergenerational rights? Today’s worldview holds that society should provide equal opportunities, not outcomes. Even if equal opportunities are achieved, household outcomes will differ markedly. The next generation will take these contingent outcomes as their starting points. Should children, then, be allowed to sue their parents for failing to provide proper opportunities?[6] Resetting the ‘equal opportunity’ clock for each generation would seem both a tall order and incompatible with the concept of personal inheritance.
• Time and action come to a standstill until adjudication occurs. For example, arguably, a generation has been lost in attempts to adjudicate obligations to mitigate climate change. In contrast, coalitions might at least have contributed to addressing the problem. Furthermore, once adjudicated, a right becomes an entitlement that remains unchallenged despite changing circumstances.
• Intergenerational justice has spawned subordinate debates, such as animal rights. In a holistic ‘Gaia’ framework, one cannot restrict rights to the ‘living’ – an ambiguous concept in itself. At this point, the issue becomes utterly intractable (e.g., should the smallpox virus have rights?).

Atoning for past sins and creating equal opportunities for today and the future, amidst a dynamic of ever-expanding choices, seems beyond the capacity of any society. The points listed above indicate that a theoretical solution is unlikely to emerge soon. Framing the issue as a matter of ‘conflicting rights’ rather than fair inheritance renders it as divisive as it is unsolvable – at least in principle. To me, the concept is filled with empty rhetoric and ‘feel-good’ sentiments, more a ghost than a reality.

The plenitude of practical action

Eschewing principle-based discussions, some countries have addressed ‘the rights of future generations’ practically – at least in relation to the environment.

New Zealand established a Commissioner for the Environment in 1986.[7] Reflecting its intended supra-partisan nature, the Commissioner is directly accountable to Parliament and issues reports or recommendations independently of the executive. The Commissioner functions more as an ‘Ombudsman’ than a judicial authority. Ombudsmen typically investigate complaints and attempt resolution through recommendations (binding or not) or mediation. Rather than narrowing issues to specific legal points, Ombudsmen can craft broader solutions encompassing complementary or separate issues. Workable compromises and inclusiveness, not rights adjudication, are the goals.

While living in New Zealand, I came to appreciate the office’s long-term perspective, as well as the soundness of its research and recommendations. Of course, no one is perfect. I remember startling Dr Williams, the then Commissioner, by pointing out that one of the greatest rural pollutants in New Zealand was noise. To him, noise was mainly an urban problem. Yet, New Zealand’s pristine scenery depends heavily on silence. Sound waves travel long distances and around obstacles, easily destroying pristine quiet. I reminded Dr Williams that even the rumble of a single car on tarmac reverberates throughout a valley. Admittedly, our brains are adept at ignoring noise, though not sufficiently to prevent the associated stress.

Hungary has introduced a somewhat similar system,[8] and other countries are following suit. The ‘philosophical’ foundations of such institutions are deliberately left vague. These systems trace back to the original vision of ‘sustainable development’ and favour pragmatic action over theoretical justification. They are more about construction than limitation.

These inclusive institutions help manage, rather than adjudicate, conflicts. They seek points of convergence and commonality while preserving much-needed flexibility. Such institutions catalyse cooperation among the willing and foster empowerment. They recognise that ‘good enough’ is preferable to stasis – even if it falls short of the ideal. Finally, such ‘light’ institutions provide a welcome insurance against the unexpected, which is inevitable in matters as significant as the environment – whether natural or social.

The post was first published on DeepDip.

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1. http://bit.ly/1HdaFLL
2. ‘The term sustainable development was coined in the paper Our common future, released by the Brundtland Commission. Sustainable development is the kind of development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The two key concepts of sustainable development are: the concept of “needs” in particular the essential needs of the world’s poorest people, to which they should be given overriding priority; and the idea of limitations which is imposed by the state of technology and social organisation on the environment’s ability to meet both present and future needs. (…) The particular ambiguity and openness-to-interpretation of this definition has allowed for widespread support from diverse efforts, groups, and organisations. It lays out a core set of guiding principles that can be enriched by an evolving global discourse.’
3. The alternative, say ‘continental’ view of historically grown rights differs from the contract-based view as to the emergence of the rights. They both share, however, the unchanging or entitlement character, which gives precedent and consistency an overarching role.
4. A contrary view is held, albeit not justified, in much of the theoretical literature. ‘Depending on the understanding of the relevant principles of distributive justice to be applied, if there is an intergenerational conflict of interests, present generations may be obligated by considerations of justice not to pursue policies that create benefits for themselves but impose costs on those who will live in the future.’ (emphasis mine) https://stanford.io/1IHt98n
5. See e.g. Amartya Sen: Development as freedom.
6. The extreme position would entail the assertion that children have the right ‘not to be born.’
7. http://bit.ly/19fI6Su
8. http://bit.ly/1ClTAOy