Third-party counterinsurgency: Evolution and challenges

Since ISIS has crashed onto the Middle-East scene, counterinsurgency (COIN) has received a new lease on life. Pundits have opined on how best to defeat this novel insurgency. Being ignorant of the matter, I have looked into the book Counterinsurgency by David Kilcullen, who is considered to be one of the most knowledgeable authors on this subject. Here is his definition:

‘Counterinsurgency, therefore, is an umbrella term that describes the complete range of measures that governments take to defeat insurgencies. These measures may be political, administrative, military, economic, psychological, or informational, and are almost always used in combination. Importantly, the precise approach any particular government takes to defeat an insurgency depends very much on the character of that government, making counterinsurgency, at its heart, a form of opposed or contested governance, albeit a hideously violent one.’

Is the insurgent an enemy

One is struck by the term ‘defeat’, which occurs twice in this quote, and recurs often in the introductory chapter and beyond. It reveals categorical thinking – a ‘them vs us’ mindset – in which one side wins and the other is ‘suffocated’ (Kilcullen visualises his thinking with an ‘iceberg’ diagram; insurgents, above and below a ‘detection threshold’, form the tip of a pyramid, separated from the underlying levels of ‘sympathisers’ and ‘population’ by a dark grey layer labelled ‘supporting infrastructure’). In the author’s view, insurgents will always be insurgents – there may be deceit and disguise on their part, but never ambiguity or opportunism.

The only question for him is ‘how to neutralise insurgents?’ Henceforth, the main thrust of the book is tactical. The author has a new approach: rather than the conventional ‘enemy-centred approach’, he proposes a ‘population-centred approach’. Judging non-combatants to be either hostile or passive, the conventional model aimed at encysting the population (e.g. in strategic hamlets as in Vietnam – ‘drain the pond to catch the fish’). The modern and more ambitious approach the author proposes is to encyst the insurgents by assisting the population in actively rejecting them (the experience of the French in Algeria demonstrates the frailty of this approach; cooperation with local elites initially succeeded but ultimately undermined their power base; see Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century by Eric R. Wolf).

Needless to say, this second approach is far more resource-, skill-, and time-intensive. More fundamentally, it synchronises security and peace-building efforts, creating a perilous chicken-and-egg situation (see Afghan Lessons: Culture, Diplomacy, Counterinsurgency by Fernando Gentilini). It smacks of counsel of perfection, a favourite mindset of the adviser (the author lists ’28 articles’ as critical ‘do-and-don’t’ items for company-level COIN; for example: ‘6. Find a political/cultural advisor’ is excellent advice, but impractical if none is available). From a different perspective, ‘security’ can be focused on hot spots; ‘peace-building’, however, should ‘leave no citizen behind’, lest he resort to insurgency to get attention (Deng Xiaoping’s dictum, ‘Let some get rich first,’ works only if others lack alternatives; in counterinsurgency, changing sides is always a permanent option).

Leaving the feasibility of either approach aside, Kilcullen’s mindset excludes reconciliation: once an ‘enemy’, always an enemy. On the other hand, if at the heart of the conflict there is ‘contested’ governance, it should be possible to move gradually to a ‘better peace’ in which both sides come to an enduring compromise and move forward together (Northern Ireland would be a case in point). The fog of peace seamlessly replaces the fog of war – an emergent and unpredictable process (the fog of peace often includes myth formation for face-saving purposes. Switzerland extensively used national myth-formation to cover murky balances of interests; see Die Geschichte der Schweiz. Von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart by Volker Reinhardt).

Third-party counterinsurgency

In the West, major instances of ‘contested governance’ were called civil wars (e.g. USA, Russia, Spain, and Greece); lesser ones ‘banditism’ (Italy) or ‘terrorism’ (Germany, Italy). The term ‘insurgency’ originates in a colonial (third-country) setting. After WWII, France bore the major brunt of insurgency (Indochina, Algeria) and developed corresponding doctrines (see Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula). It was not alone, though: the UK had significant events (Malaysia, Cyprus, Kenya), as did the Netherlands and Portugal.

The USA inaugurated ‘third-party counterinsurgency’ – from the first covert efforts in South America to Vietnam: it intervened on behalf of a ‘threatened’ sovereign government (in some cases, the USA backed military coups or insurgents, as seen with limited results in Afghanistan after 1980). Since then, third-country counterinsurgency has disappeared for all practical purposes: we only have third-party counterinsurgencies.

Problems of third-party counterinsurgency

Third-party counterinsurgencies are fraught with problems of their own:

(a) Third-party counterinsurgency is extremely resource intensive. Such resources may not be forthcoming (France in Vietnam) or may be poorly applied (Iraq, Afghanistan). What then?

(b) When the third party announces its intention to withdraw, the insurgents often adopt a waiting game, using sporadic hit-and-run tactics to exhaust the intervening force – leveraging what Kilcullen calls the ‘longevity advantage’. Meanwhile, the third party, focused on short-term goals, may make poor strategic choices. Once the withdrawal occurs, the supported government is left to face the insurgents alone, often suffering a catastrophic loss of credibility and stability, as seen in Vietnam and Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.

(c) Intended as supportive and supplementary, a third-party intervention tends to substitute for the government effort (Vietnam, Iraq). Moral hazard ensues when the government leaves the political and material cost of the initiative to the third party while expecting to reap the benefits.

(d) The ‘principal-agent problem’ from economics is highly evident in third-party counterinsurgencies. Normally, the principal (the one providing resources) can incentivise the agent (the one acting on their behalf) to ensure their actions align with the principal’s goals. However, in third-party counterinsurgencies, the roles are reversed. The agent (local government or forces) controls the resources and leverage, leaving the principal (the intervening third party) unable to effectively influence or compel the agent to act in alignment with its objectives, as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(e) The third party is seldom selfless: its intervention often (mostly?) reflects larger geopolitical considerations of its own (Nixon’s opening to China may have been a calculated move to defuse the ‘domino effect’).

(f) The very presence of a third party tends to harden and transform the conflict by raising nationalistic feelings all round (Algeria, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan).

(g) A disproportion of means between the third party and the government inevitably leads to widespread or even terminal corruption as it becomes the main source of income for elites (Afghanistan).

(h) While there may be consensus on the importance of establishing security in counterinsurgency efforts (a challenging goal on its own), disagreements often arise over how to approach peace-building. Key questions include the level of reconstruction, human rights adherence, and democratic reforms needed to achieve a sustainable peace. Third-party interventions often adopt ambitious, one-size-fits-all strategies, aiming for extensive and idealistic outcomes, as highlighted in How Not to Win a War by Mark Danner (Stripping Bare the Body: Politics, Violence, War).

Kilcullen’s book concentrates on the means, and in doing so, suggests ‘doability’ under all circumstances. It implies that tactics can overcome poor strategy: brave brawn is better than brain. This is a dangerous attitude to propose when ‘doing nothing is not an option.’

The post was first published on DeepDip.

Explore more of Aldo Matteucci’s insights on the Ask Aldo chatbot.